THE
COUNSELOR’S CORNER
The United States Supreme Court has
struck again. In an absolutely horrible
decision, the US Supreme Court ruled five to four that in a criminal case, if a
defendant’s lawyer has a conflict of interest, and that becomes the grounds
upon which the defendant seeks a new trial, the defendant needs to prove that
the conflict of interest adversely affected the lawyer’s performance. Well, of course it did. This is absolutely ridiculous.
This was a murder case, and the
defendant’s attorney had previously represented the MURDER VICTIM! Walter Mickins, Jr. was the accused in this
case, and he was charged with attempted forcible sodomy and the murder of then
seventeen-year-old Timothy Hall. Mr.
Mickins had no idea that his attorney had also been Mr. Hall’s lawyer,
pertaining to juvenile court charges Mr. Hall had been facing at the
time. At trial, Mr. Mickins was
convicted of felony murder and got the death sentence.
Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia said that the conflict does not “render the verdict unreliable.” I am much more inclined to agree with
Justice Stevens, who in his dissent, found that this “rule that allows the
State to foist a murder victim’s lawyer onto his accused is not only
capricious; it poisons the integrity of our adversary system of justice.”
Perhaps the most practical view of
all comes from Justice Souter in his dissent, as he stated quite appropriately
that “failures on the part of conflicted counsel will elude demonstration after
the fact, simply because they so often consist of what did not happen.” And how do you prove what did not
happen? How do you not find that this
renders the verdict unreliable?
All that is left now for Mr. Mickins
is an attempt at clemency from the Governor of the State of Virginia, which is
where this took place. I am right with
Mr. Micklin’s appellate attorney, one Ed Wagner, who complains that “it’s an
unconscionable system of justice that would allow this type of representation
in a death penalty case to go unchecked.”
In basic terms, this comes down to a
matter of fairness. If I am
representing you, and your brother allegedly shoots you, I cannot then be
appointed to represent your brother.
The reasons for this should be fairly clear, as I have gotten to know you,
and may well be less than pleased with the fact that your brother has decided
to end your life. Then again, I might
not be so displeased; however, in no way should I be permitted to become the
attorney in the murder case. The risk
of my being affected by my previous attorney role is just too strong. This especially holds true in a death
penalty murder case. If there is ever a
time to make one hundred percent certain that a lawyer does his all; this is
the case. A man is sentenced to die
because of representation he received that may well have been shaky or flat-out
deficient, and the United States Supreme Court sanctions it. Unbelievable!
Charlie Unger is a criminal defense attorney in the Glendale
law firm of Flanagan, Unger, Danis & Grover, and a psychotherapist at the
Foothill Centre for Personal and Family Development. Mr. Unger writes a bimonthly column on legal and psychological
issues. He can be reached at charlie@charlieunger.com or at (818) 244-8694